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Introduction
Following the European model of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the
state of California implemented the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) on January 1,
2020. 2 The CCPA allows any California consumer to demand to see all of the information that a
company has saved on them; consumers can also request a full list of all the third parties that their
data is shared with, sold to, and for what commercial purpose. 3 This paper reviews the implications
of a new law on the disclosure of trade secrets like client lists and algorithms that manipulate
consumers’ data. Ultimately, the issue comes down to which rights are more important: personal
privacy or trade privacy?

When Data Sharing Goes Wrong: Why Privacy Laws Are Necessary
More than 185 million people in the United States and Canada use Facebook® on a daily
basis. 4 Facebook monetizes user information through targeted advertising, which generated most
of the company’s $55.8 billion in revenues in 2018. 5 To encourage users to share information on
its platform, Facebook promises users they can control the privacy of their information through
Facebook’s privacy settings. 6
Among other things, a 2012 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order prohibited Facebook
from making misrepresentations about the privacy or security of consumers’ personal information,
and the extent to which it shares personal information, such as names and dates of birth, with third

2

Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (Deering 2020).
Id.
4
Federal Trade Comm’n, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook
(July 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweepingnew-privacy-restrictions.
5
Id.
6
Id.
3
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parties. 7 The FTC alleged that “Facebook violated the 2012 order by deceiving its users when
Facebook shared the data of users’ Facebook friends with third-party app developers, even when
those friends had set more restrictive privacy settings.” 8
Facebook “launched various services such as ‘Privacy Shortcuts’ in late 2012 and ‘Privacy
Checkup’ in 2014 that claimed to help users better manage their privacy settings.” 9 However, these
services “allegedly failed to disclose that even when users chose the most restrictive sharing
settings, Facebook could still share user information with the apps of the user’s Facebook friends—
unless they also went to the ‘Apps Settings Page’ and opted out of such sharing.” 10 The FTC
alleged that Facebook did not disclose anywhere on the Privacy Settings page or the ‘About’
section of the profile page that Facebook could still share information with third-party developers
on the Facebook platform about an app users Facebook friends. 11
Further, “Facebook announced in April 2014 that it would stop allowing third-party
developers to collect data about the friends of app users (‘affected friend data’).” 12 Despite this
promise, Facebook “told developers that [the developers] could collect this data until April 2015
if they already had an existing app on the platform.” 13 The FTC alleged that Facebook waited
“until at least June 2018 to stop sharing user information with third-party apps used by their
Facebook friends.” 14
The FTC also alleged that Facebook “misrepresented users’ ability to control the use of
facial recognition technology with their accounts.” 15 According to the complaint, Facebook’s
7

Id.
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
8
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updated data policy from April 2018 “was deceptive to tens of millions of users who have
Facebook’s facial recognition setting called ‘Tag Suggestions’ because that setting was turned on
by default, and the updated data policy suggested that users would need to opt-in to having facial
recognition enabled for their accounts.” 16
In addition to these violations of its 2012 order, the FTC alleged that “Facebook violated
the FTC Act’s prohibition against deceptive practices when it told users it would collect their
phone numbers to enable a security feature [] but did not disclose that it also used those numbers
for advertising purposes.” 17
Following a yearlong investigation by the FTC, the Department of Justice filed a complaint
on behalf of the FTC alleging that Facebook repeatedly used deceptive disclosures and settings to
undermine users’ privacy preferences in violation of its 2012 FTC order. 18 “These tactics allowed
the company to share users’ personal information with third-party apps that were downloaded by
the user’s Facebook ‘friends.’” 19 The FTC alleged “that many users were unaware that Facebook
was sharing such information, and therefore did not take the steps needed to opt-out of sharing.” 20
The FTC also alleged that Facebook “took inadequate steps to deal with applications that it knew
were violating its platform policies.” 21
In 2019, the FTC charged Facebook for violating their 2012 FTC order by “deceiving users
about their ability to control the privacy of their personal information.” 22 Facebook was ordered
to pay a record-breaking $5 billion penalty and submit to new restrictions and a modified corporate

16

Id.
Id.
18
Id.; see also Complaint for Civil Penalties, Injunction, and Other Relief, 1-5, 50, United States v. Facebook, Inc.,
No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
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structure to “hold the company accountable for the decisions it makes about its users’ privacy.” 23
“The $5 billion penalty against Facebook is the largest ever imposed on any company for violating
consumers’ privacy and almost 20 times greater than the largest privacy or data security penalty
ever imposed worldwide.” 24 This penalty is also one of the most substantial penalties “ever
assessed by the U.S. government for any violation.” 25
As part of Facebook’s order-mandated privacy program, which also covers WhatsApp and
Instagram, Facebook must conduct a privacy review of every new or modified product, service, or
practice before it is implemented, and document its decisions about user privacy. 26 Designated
compliance officers at Facebook must generate a quarterly privacy review report, which they must
share with the CEO and an independent assessor; they must also share these reports with the FTC
upon request. 27 The order also requires Facebook to document incidents themselves and its efforts
to address such incidents when data of 500 or more users has been compromised, and deliver this
documentation to the FTC and the assessor within 30 days of Facebook’s discovery of the
incident. 28
The $5 billion Facebook fine has provided a great example of what not to do in the privacy
world and why privacy laws are necessary to protect individual rights. However, Facebook is a
for-profit business that has likely spent a significant amount of time and money on creating
innovative business methods, and businesses should be entitled to the fruits of their innovations

23

Id.
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.; see also Plaintiff's Consent Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty, Monetary Judgment, and
Injunctive Relief and Memorandum in Support, United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24,
2019).
27
Id.
28
Id.
24
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that potentially qualify as trade secrets. So how do we balance a company’s innovation rights with
an individual’s privacy rights?

Privacy Law Background
The European Union (EU) implemented the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
on May 25, 2018. 29 Though the GDPR was drafted and passed by the EU, it imposes obligations
onto organizations anywhere so long as they target or collect data related to people in the EU. 30
The GDPR “will levy harsh fines against those who violate its privacy and security standards, with
penalties reaching into the tens of millions of euros.” 31
By implementing the GDPR, “Europe is signaling its firm stance on data privacy and
security at a time when more people are entrusting their personal data with cloud services and data
breaches are a daily occurrence.” 32 The GDPR is “large, far-reaching, and fairly light on specifics,”
which makes GDPR compliance “a daunting prospect, particularly for small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs).” 33
The United States has no fully federal law like the GDPR; what currently exists is a
patchwork of federal laws and regulations along with some individual state laws. 34 For example,
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) set national standards for
protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health

29

2016 O.J. (L 119) 1. 2016/679.
Id. Article 3(1)
31
Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law?, (Accessed 7 April 2020), available at:
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Sean Hackbarth, A Patchwork is Not Acceptable’: Making the Case for a National Privacy Law, U.S. Chamber of
Com. – Above the Fold (Jul. 29, 2019, 9:00 A.M.), https://www.uschamber.com/series/above-the-fold/patchworknot-acceptable-making-the-case-national-privacy-law
30
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information. 35 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires financial institutions—companies that offer
consumers financial products or services like loans, financial or investment advice, or insurance—
to explain their information-sharing practices to their customers and to safeguard sensitive data. 36
The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects the privacy of student education
records. 37 FERPA applies to all schools that receive funds under an applicable program of the U.S.
Department of Education. 38 The CAN-SPAM Act sets the rules for commercial email, establishes
requirements for commercial messages, gives recipients the right to opt out of emails, and spells
out tough penalties for violations. 39
At the state level, there is the California Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), which, at the
time this paper is being written, just went into effect a few months ago on January 1, 2020. 40 The
CCPA is the first state-level privacy law in the United States whih gives the strongest privacy
rights to consumers, and is setting the pace for other proposed state privacy legislation. 41
Minnesota is one of the many states endeavoring to enact legislation similar to the CCPA. 42
Proposed by Representative Steve Elkins in March 2020, Minnesota bill HF 3936 models the
CCPA. 43 HF 3936 would potentially apply to large Minnesota companies and other companies
that intentionally market to Minnesota residents which hold data for over 100,000 consumers or
derive over half of their revenue from the sale of personal information and have information about

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d (1996).
Gramm-Leach Bliley Act (GLBA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809, §§ 6821-6827 (1999).
37
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1974).
38
34 C.F.R Part 99.1 (2012).
39
CAN-SPAM Act, 16 C.F.R. §316 (2003).
40
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (Deering 2020).
41
Gilad Edelman, California’s Privacy Law Goes Into Effect Today. Now What?, WIRED, Jan 1, 2020,
https://www.wired.com/story/ccpa-guide-california-privacy-law-takes-effect/.
42
H.R. 3936, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2020).
43
Id.
35
36
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at least 25,000 consumers. 44 However, the proposed Minnesota legislation includes additional
definitions specific to geolocation data and facial recognition data that the CCPA does not cover. 45
If each of the fifty states enacts legislation similar, but not uniform, to the CCPA, it will
place an unrealistic burden on companies to potentially comply with fifty different versions of
privacy laws if a company wants to do business in all fifty states. However, individual state
legislation will likely be necessary before the federal government steps in and enacts a law, even
though the federal law will likely preempt all of the individual state laws. While certain legislation
is more appropriately left to the states instead of the federal government, businesses will be greatly
advantaged to only have to comply with a single federal law as opposed to having to comply with
fifty individual state laws. Nevertheless, states will be able to set the tone of federal legislation by
first creating their own laws, which is what the Founding Fathers wanted—for states to be a
laboratory of creating law. Regardless of whether more states enact privacy laws, or the federal
government finally does, the CCPA will be influential because it is the most comprehensive
privacy law that currently exists in the United States.

The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
California implemented the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) on January 1,
2020. 46 The Act provides California residents with the right to:
1) Know what personal data is being collected about them;
2) Know whether their personal data is sold or disclosed and to whom;
3) Know the business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling personal
information.
4) Opt-out of the sale of personal data;
5) Access their personal data;

44

Id.
Id.
46
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (Deering 2020).
45
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6) Request a business to delete any personal information about a consumer collected from
that consumer; and
7) Not be discriminated against for exercising their privacy rights. 47

The CCPA applies to any business that collects consumers' personal data, with the exception of
non-profits and governmental entities. 48 The CCPA defines a “business” as any sole
proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation, association, or other legal
entity that is not considered a nonprofit entity under the California Nonprofit Corporation Law. 49
Although the CCPA does not define “doing business,” a typical definition can be found in
the California Revenue and Taxation Code. 50 A company is doing business in California if it
actively engages in any transaction for the purpose of financial or pecuniary gain or profit in
California, or if any of the following conditions are satisfied:
1) The business is organized or commercially domiciled in California;
2) Sales 51 of the business in California, including sales by the agents and independent
contractors of the business, exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 25% of the business’ total
sales; 52
3) Real and tangible personal property of the business in California exceed the lesser of
$50,000 or 25% of the business’s total real and tangible personal property; or
4) The amount that the business pays for compensation in California exceeds the lesser of
$50,000 or 25% of the total compensation paid by the business. 53

47

Id.
Id. at § 1798.140(c).
49
The California Nonprofit Corporation Law (Division 2 of the Title 1 of the California Corporations Code)
provides that nonprofit entities can incorporate as Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporations, Nonprofit Mutual Benefit
Corporations, or Nonprofit Religious Corporations. The law further provides that an unincorporated nonprofit
association must contain language in its creating document that the association is not allowed to keep the proceeds
from business activities and the proceeds must be used for nonprofit purposes.
50
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23101 (2012).
51
As defined in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25120, subdiv. (e) or (f).
52
For purposes of Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23101, sales in California are determined using the rules for assigning
sales under Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25135, 25136(b) and the regulations thereunder, as modified by regulations
under § 25137.
53
As defined in Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25120.
48
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For the conditions above, the sales, property, and payroll of the taxpayer include the business’ pro
rata or distributive share of pass-through entities. 54 "Pass-through entities" means partnerships,
LLCs treated as partnerships, or S corporations. 55
Thus, companies that meet the requirements above as “doing business in California” are
subject to the CCPA if one or more of the following are true:
1) The business has gross annual revenues in excess of $25 million; or
2) The business buys, receives, or sells the personal information of 50,000 or more
consumers, households, or devices; or
3) The business derives fifty percent or more of annual revenues from selling consumers’
personal information. 56

The CCPA also applies to businesses that “control,” are “controlled by,” or have “common
branding” with a business that satisfies one or more of the above-identified criteria. 57 Businesses
that handle the personal information of more than four million consumers will also have additional
obligations. 58
“There are various partial exemptions available for certain types of information collected
by entities that are also subject to federal privacy laws.” 59 The most important and potentially
relevant exemptions apply to certain information processed, or to businesses covered, pursuant to
the protections of certain federal regulations. 60 “For example, HIPAA-covered entities (and
business associates) are not exempt from the CCPA, but protected health information collected by
a covered entity or business associate governed by the privacy, security and breach notification

54

Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 23101.
Id.
56
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (2020).
57
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (2020).
58
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (2020).
59
Theodore Augustinos and Laura Ferguson, CCPA Guide: Are You Covered by the CCPA, JD SUPRA, (January 15,
2019), available at: https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ccpa-guide-are-you-covered-by-the-ccpa-38771/.
60
Id.
55
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rules promulgated pursuant to HIPAA is exempt.” 61 However, “not all information collected by
HIPAA-covered entities and business associates is ‘governed by’ these rules.” 62 For example, IP
addresses “collected by a HIPAA covered entity appear to be subject to the requirements and
protections of the CCPA, even though protected health information collected by the same entity
would be exempt.” 63
Similarly, nonpublic personal information processed by a financial institution subject to
the privacy, security and breach notification rules promulgated under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act would be exempt, but the financial institution would be required to comply with the CCPA
with respect to other information (such as information collected when tracking website visitors or
providing targeted online advertisements) collected by the financial institution. 64 In addition, this
exemption does not apply to the consumer’s right to sue for statutory damages as a result of data
breach. 65
As far as this paper is concerned, the most relevant portions of the CCPA are the disclosure
requirements for which companies doing business in California must now comply. Upon the
request of a consumer, companies doing business in California must disclose the following:
1) The categories of personal information it has collected about that consumer;
2) The categories of sources from which the personal information is collected;
3) The business or commercial purpose for collecting or selling personal
information;
4) The categories of third parties with whom the business shares personal
information; and
5) The specific pieces of personal information it has collected about that
consumer. 66

61

Id. citing Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145 (c)(1)(A).
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. citing Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(e).
65
Id. citing Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.145(f).
66
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-199 (2020).
62
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Up to twice in twelve months, a business must deliver to the consumer all of the consumer’s
personal information collected upon a consumer’s request. 67 In the context of the CCPA,
“personal information” covers a much broader range of information than “personally identifiable
information (PII),” a term commonly used in the United States. 68 Put differently, while all PII
may be considered personal information, not all personal information is PII. 69
As defined by the US Office of Privacy and Open Government, PII is
information which can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity,
such as their name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when
combined with other personal or identifying information which is linked or
linkable to a specific individual, such as date and place of birth, mother’s maiden
name, etc. 70
To distinguish an individual is to identify an individual by discerning one person from another
and to trace an individual is to process sufficient information to determine a specific aspect of an
individual‘s activities or status. 71 Accordingly, one’s name, email address, postal address, phone
number, and personal ID numbers (e.g., social security, passport, and driver’s license) are
considered PII. 72
The CCPA aims to prevent the sale or sharing of California consumers’ personal
information without their permission, and it protects more than the conventional types of
“personal data” such as name, telephone number, and social security number. 73 Under the
CCPA, “personal information” includes, but is not limited to, the following if it identifies, relates

67

Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(d) (2020).
Malia Thuret-Benoist, What is the difference between personally identifiable information (PII) and personal
data?, TECH GDPR (June 27, 2019), https://techgdpr.com/blog/difference-between-pii-and-personal-data/.
69
Id.
70
Office of Privacy and Open Government, Properly safeguarding personally identifiable information (PII) and
business identifiable information (PII), U.S. Department of Commerce (Accessed 17 April 2020),
https://www.osec.doc.gov/opog/privacy/pii_bii.html.
71
Thuret-Benoist, supra note 65.
72
Thuret-Benoist, supra note 64.
73
Cal. Consumer Prot. Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798
68
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to, describes, is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked,
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household:
A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique personal identifier,
online identifier, internet protocol address, email address, account name, social
security number, driver’s license number, passport number, or other similar
identifiers;
B) Any categories of personal information described in subdivision (e) of Section
1798.80;
C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California or federal law;
D) Commercial information, including records of personal property, products or
services purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming
histories or tendencies;
E) Biometric information;
F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not
limited to, browsing history, search history, and information regarding a
consumer’s interaction with an internet website, application, or advertisement;
G) Geolocation data;
H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information;
I) Professional or employment-related information;
J) Education information, defined as information that is not publicly available
personally identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational Rights
and Privacy Act (20 U.S.C. Sec. 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99); and
K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this subdivision to
create a profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences,
characteristics, psychological trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes,
intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes. 74

Further, the CCPA considers a person’s browsing and search history, geolocation data,
biometrics, and other types of information that has not been “de-identified” to be worthy of
regulation, as well. 75 “Deidentified” means:
information that cannot reasonably identify, relate to, describe, be capable of
being associated with, or be linked, directly or indirectly, to a particular
consumer, provided that a business that uses de-identified information: 1) has
implemented technical safeguards that prohibit reidentification of the consumer to
whom the information may pertain; 2) has implemented business processes that
specifically prohibit reidentification of the information; 3) has implemented

74
75

Id. at subdiv. (o)(1)(A–K).
See id. at subdiv. (o)(1).
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business processes to prevent inadvertent release of de-identified information; and
4) makes no attempt to reidentify the information. 76

Trade Secret Law Background
A trade secret is information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that:
i) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and
ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy. 77
Essentially, trade secrets encompass knowledge of economic commercial value, generated by
people who have an interest in protecting their value, in order to gain a competitive economic
advantage over other businesses. 78 If a business chooses not to protect its trade secrets, it is likely
they will not be considered trade secrets at all.
When it comes to protecting an intellectual asset, businesses must decide whether to protect
the intellectual asset with classic Intellectual Property (IP) rights, for example filing for patent or
copyright protection, or to keep the asset as a trade secret. Because patents and copyrights only
provide a limited monopoly of rights, 79 it may be in the best interests of those who have patentable
or copyrightable ideas to keep their secrets rather than to take a limited monopoly. Unlike
trademark and copyright law, trade secrets do not require a formal registration process, and unlike

76

Id. at subdiv. (h)(1–4).
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
78
See id.
79
Generally: 20 years from the earliest non-provisional domestic filing date for a utility patent (35 U.S.C. § 154); 15
years from issuance for a design patent (35 U.S.C. § 173); the life of the author plus an additional 70 years for
copyright works created after January 1, 1978 (17 U.S.C. § 302); 95 years from the year of its first publication or a
term of one hundred and twenty years from the year of its creation, whichever expires first, for an anonymous work,
a pseudonymous work, or a work made for hire (17 U.S.C. § 302).
77
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patent law, trade secrets do not require a governmental grant. 80 Instead, trade secrets potentially
last forever, protect a broad class of information, and, most importantly, do not require
disclosure. 81
One of the best kept trade secrets in the world is the recipe for Coca-Cola®. 82 Developed
by a pharmacist, it has been closely guarded and known to only a few privileged employees for
more than 100 years. 83 Coca-Cola® built a successful global brand on it, and competitors have
fiercely hunted it. 84 Similarly, Colonel Sanders' secret recipe of 11 herbs and spices for Kentucky
Fried Chicken® (KFC®) and the formula for WD-40® are also closely kept secrets that have
helped to build their companies' flagship products. 85
A company can quickly lose its competitive advantage if their trade secrets are improperly
managed. Just imagine the level of over-caffeinated law students if someone figured out a way to
replicate the secret Coca-Cola® recipe and then shared the formula in what would undoubtedly be
a viral YouTube® video. This is why companies go to great lengths to protect their prized secrets.
KFC® built a brand new, high-tech safe to safeguard the Colonel's handwritten Original Recipe
from 1940. 86 The FireKing® digital safe weighs more than 770 pounds, is encased in two feet of
concrete, and has a 24-hour video and motion-detection surveillance system. 87

80

Atin Basuchoudhary & Nicola Searle, Snatched secrets: Cybercrime and trade secrets modelling a firm's decision
to report a theft of trade secrets (Nov. 2019), available at:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404819300616.
81
Id.
82
R. Mark Halligan, The Secret of Trade Secret Success (Feb. 9, 2010), available at:
https://www.forbes.com/2010/02/19/protecting-trade-secrets-leadership-managing-halliganhaas.html#6ac719de1372.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
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That level of security is only necessary because the recipe provides KFC with a substantial
market advantage. Accordingly, trade secrets generally include any secret information that can
provide a company with an advantage in the market; trade secrets may encompass customer
identities and pricing information, current research projects, and even failed projects. 88 In the case
of WD-40®, the product's name comes from the fortieth try by scientists to come up with a "water
displacement" formula for a rust-prevention solvent and degreaser for the aerospace industry. 89
Not only is the WD-40® formula a trade secret, but so are the formulas and work that went into
the preceding thirty-nine attempts. 90 Learning about those failed attempts alone would likely save
numerous research and development time and expenses for a competitor. 91
However, it is not enough that confidential information maintains its secrecy; it must also
be valuable and derive value from the fact of its secrecy. 92 For instance, Facebook’s algorithm that
chooses what posts you see and what order those posts are shown in your News Feed is valuable
to Facebook because it is secret. Facebook’s competitors cannot easily copy the algorithm and
offer their own version for use elsewhere—competitors are forced to develop their own algorithms
to manipulate the same kind of user data.
Businesses often have no choice but to depend upon the law of trade secrets as a primary
source of protection for certain types of valuable business information that they do not want to
become public. 93 Previously , the protection provided by the common law of trade secrets and the
steps necessary to obtain it were often matters of substantial uncertainty. 94 The choices that courts

88

Id.
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
93
1 BUSINESS TORTS § 17.05 (2020).
94
Id.
89
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have made between competing policies or various theoretical bases of common law trade secret
protection have historically produced inconsistent outcomes. 95 Concern over this variation led to
the promulgation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”). 96 The UTSA is now the single most
significant source of controlling trade secret misappropriation law. As of April 2020, forty-eight
states as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have adopted either the 1979 or 1985
version of the UTSA. 97 In January 2020, New York also introduced the UTSA to the Senate
Judiciary for enactment. 98
In 1979, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws approved the UTSA and recommended it
for adoption in all states. 99 The most significant contribution of the UTSA is the definite focus and
structure it provides for the analysis of trade secret claims, including a specific statute of limitations
and a statutorily defined cause of action. 100 By its terms, the UTSA displaces all other noncontractual causes of action for relief that are based upon the misappropriation of a trade secret. 101
A primary purpose of the UTSA is to codify basic principles of common law as enumerated
in the better-reasoned court decisions. 102 Concern was also expressed that inconsistency in the
95
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97
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laws of various states was leading to forum shopping. 103 Thus, even in those jurisdictions in which
the common law continues to control, decisions under the UTSA may be cited as persuasive
authority for the modern view of the principles that govern trade secret misappropriation.

104

Data As A Trade Secret
Courts have found that virtually any type of information that is capable of being used in a
business to obtain a competitive advantage may qualify as a trade secret. 105 Trade secrets can
include manufacturing processes, product formulations, plans, blueprints for machines or tools,
business plans, or computer programs. 106 Under appropriate circumstances, customer lists also
qualify as trade secrets. 107
Technology companies like Facebook often consider their trade secrets to be the data that
they collect, the algorithms that manipulate that data, and the companies to whom they sell that
manipulated data (i.e. the data’s commercial purpose and their customer lists). 108 Customer lists
and other lists related to customer business qualify for trade secret protection if the lists'
information cannot be ascertained from other generally available sources. 109 In Morlife, Inc. v.
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Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1521 (1997) (citing Am. Paper & Packaging Prods., Inc. v. Kirgan,
183 Cal. App. 3d 1318, 1326 (1986) (noting that "courts are reluctant to protect customer lists to the extent they
embody information which is 'readily ascertainable' through public sources," but that courts recognize as trade
secrets customer lists where plaintiff "has expended time and effort identifying customers with particular needs or
characteristics"); ABBA Rubber Co. v. Seaquist, 235 Cal. App. 3d 1, 18 (1991) ("A customer list is one of the types
of information which can qualify as a trade secret.") (citations omitted); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 782 F.
Supp. 2d 911, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (noting that client lists have potential or actual value from not being generally
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Perry, the California Court of Appeals held that customer identities from an organization's list are
protected as trade secrets if the identities are not generally known to the industry. 110 The court also
found three factors to be helpful when determining whether reasonable efforts have been made to
qualify something as a trade secret: (1) how the entity stores the information; (2) who has access
to the information; and (3) whether the information was subject to confidentiality provisions. 111
In Morlife, the court ruled that information about customers that was "stored on a computer
with restricted access" which had been subject to a confidentiality provision expressly referring to
customer names and telephone numbers was subject to trade secret protection. 112 According to
Morlife, information that is difficult and time-consuming to obtain will likely be more protectable
than information that was neither difficult nor time-consuming to obtain. 113 Further, courts have
noted that information including customer lists and contact information, pricing guidelines,
historical purchasing information, and customers' business needs or preferences typically receives
trade secret protection as it has potential or actual value from not being generally known to the
public. 114
It has been long held that certain data can be a trade secret when correctly protected. 115 A
trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives one an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors

Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 246 P.2d 11, 16 (Cal. 1952)).
110
See Morlife, 56 Cal. App. 4th at 1522.
111
See id. at 1523.
112
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See id. at 1522–1523.
114
Brocade Commc’n Systems Inc. v. A10 Networks Inc., 873 F.Supp.2d 1192, 1214–1215 (N.D. Cal. 2012); See,
e.g., ABBA, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 18 ("A customer list is one of the types of information which can qualify as a trade
secret.") (citations omitted). This information has potential or actual value from not being generally known to the
public: information about customers' preferences can aid in "securing and retaining their business." Mattel, Inc. v.
MGA Entm’t, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 972 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing Aetna Bldg. Maint. Co. v. West, 246 P.2d 11,
16 (Cal. 1952)).
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who do not know or use it. 116 The Supreme Court has also held that customer lists qualify as trade
secrets. 117 Other jurisdictions also note that customer-related information, including customer lists
and contact information, pricing guidelines, historical purchasing information, and customers'
business needs or preferences, are routinely given trade secret protection. 118 This type of
information has potential or actual value from not being generally known to the public: information
about customers' preferences can aid in securing and retaining their business. 119
Yet, there has been debate on how a customer list qualifies for trade secret protection.
California courts have found that a company can establish protectable trade secrets in its customer
lists and customer preferences when holders expend time and effort identifying customers with
particular needs or characteristics. 120 In Sun Distributing Company LLC v. Corbett, the court held
that “the value to the customer list is in the completeness and details of the list; the fact that each
individual customer has access to its own information does not make Plaintiff’s list of customers
worthless.” 121 The court also rejected the argument that the publisher information was publicly
available and therefore not protectable, reasoning that although publication names and contact
information might be public knowledge, it was clear that Sun Distributing had put in time and
effort to develop other specific information, including its customer lists, preferences, pricing
structures, and “do not deliver” lists. 122
Conversely, the court in American Paper & Packaging Products, Inc. v. Kirgan held that
a customer list was not protected as a trade secret because it was known or readily ascertainable to
116

Id. at 474-475.
Id. at 475.
118
See Brocade Commc’n, 873 F. Supp. 2d at 1214–1215.
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other persons in the competitive business of shipping, and the compilation process at issue was
neither sophisticated, difficult, nor particularly time-consuming. 123 Sometimes overlooked in the
context of marketing efforts, companies often list representative customers as a business
development tool on their websites and in other pubic arenas. As a general rule, a company should
not publicly disclose information it is trying to keep secret. 124
Because this paper focuses on the California Consumer Privacy Act, it also focuses on
California trade secret law. Like the majority of states, California has adopted a version of the
UTSA. 125 Thus, much of California’s trade secret law mirrors that of other UTSA states. One
notable difference, however, is in the definition of a trade secret that does not include the “readily
ascertainable” requirement. 126 However, the “readily ascertainable” issue still comes up in
California cases. The assertion that a matter is readily ascertainable by proper means is available
as a defense to a claim of misappropriation instead of being a burden on the plaintiff to disprove
that the information in question is readily ascertainable. 127
Concerning the general availability of customer information, courts are reluctant to protect
customer lists to the extent they embody information that is "readily ascertainable" through public
sources, such as business directories, 128 particularly because it is a requirement under the UTSA
that information not be readily ascertainable to receive trade secret protection. 129 However, where
a holder has expended time and effort identifying customers with particular needs or
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Veronica Foods Co. v. Ecklin, No. 16-CV-07223-JCS, 2017 WL 2806706, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 29, 2017)
(declining to find a trade secret where a company disclosed at least some of its customers and suppliers on its
website).
125
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3426-3426.11 (1984).
126
Id.
127
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 31 Cal. 4th 864, 899 (2003).
128
Morlife, Inc. v. Perry, 56 Cal. App. 4th 1514, 1521 (1997), see supra parenthetical text accompanying note 103,
at 21.
129
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
124

21

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

characteristics, courts will prohibit misappropriation of this information to capture a share of the
market. 130 It is this combination of elements that makes the information valuable and not generally
known to the public. 131 Such lists are to be distinguished from mere identities and locations of
customers where anyone could easily identify the entities as potential customers. 132
Even when a court finds that customer information is not generally known or readily
ascertainable, the UTSA requires that the information also have independent economic value. 133
The fact that the same information can be gathered on any one customer by talking with the
customer herself is irrelevant. 134 The value in a company's customer information is in the
compilation, categorization, and organization of information on customers, combined with the
ability to search and format it into a readily usable form. 135 Competitors do not have and cannot
easily recreate the organization of this kind of information. 136
A simple list of customers may not necessarily be a trade secret in that the identities of the
customers could readily be determined by examining any directory. 137 Information has
independent economic value and is held to be a trade secret when, for example, a database includes
the primary contact at each customer, the pricing and discounts for the customer's past contracts
with competitors, the customer's payment terms, where and how frequently that customer has
published advertisements in the past, the customer's past complaints and requests, and the
customer's personal information. 138
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The subject of a trade secret must be secret, and must not be of public knowledge or of a
general knowledge in the trade or business. 139 However, this necessary element of secrecy is not
lost if the holder of the trade secret reveals the trade secret to another "in confidence, and under an
implied obligation not to use or disclose it." 140 Disclosure to “another” may include those of the
trade secret holder's "employees to whom it is necessary to confide it, in order to apply it to the
uses for which it is intended." 141 A trade secret holder’s licensee is often the recipient of
confidential knowledge of the subject of a trade secret. 142
The protection accorded to a trade secret holder is against the disclosure or unauthorized
use of the trade secret by those to whom the secret has been confided under the express or
implied restriction of nondisclosure or nonuse. 143 The law also protects the holder of a trade
secret against disclosure or use when the knowledge is gained, not by the owner's volition, but by
some "improper means," which may include theft, wiretapping, or even aerial reconnaissance. 144
However, trade secret law does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means;
for example, by independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering. 145
Curiously, trade secret law is a two-way street: It protects confidential ideas, but it also
requires giving notice that the information is in fact a secret so that others do not use information
that they think is not confidential. 146 An implied duty of confidentiality may be found when the
other party has reason to know that the information was in fact confidential. 147 For example, the
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court in Carr v. AutoNation, Inc. held that the appellant failed to take reasonable efforts to maintain
the secrecy of his business plan when he sent the business plan to (among others) appellee's
founder, failed to label the business plan as confidential, never told appellee that the information
was confidential, and did not seek a non-disclosure agreement before sending the plan. 148 Thus,
even when a trade secret is disclosed to an employee, licensee, or the like, a holder must still make
reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. 149
Furthermore, the way in which publicly available information is combined, compiled, and
integrated has been held to entitle the resulting product to protection as a trade secret, given the
right set of facts. 150 In United States v. Nosal, the federal government (plaintiff) prosecuted
David Nosal (defendant) for trade-secret theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1832. 151 Nosal was
employed by Korn/Ferry International, a corporate executive-search firm. 152 Korn/Ferry's key
asset was its proprietary "Search" database, containing data on thousands of potential corporate
executives. 153 The data was uploaded from public sources such as LinkedIn. 154 Search's value to
Korn/Ferry was derived from its capability to aggregate previous user queries and the outcomes
of previous executive searches to refine its capability to generate targeted candidate search
lists. 155 Korn/Ferry never gave anyone access to Search without making them sign strict
confidentiality agreements, which emphasized Search's valuable and legally protected status. 156
The Search home screen notified users that it was "intended to be used by Korn/Ferry employees
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for work on Korn/Ferry business only," and search lists generated by Search were marked
"Korn/Ferry Proprietary & Confidential." 157
Nosal and several associates secretly downloaded Search data to help them establish a
rival executive-search company. 158 Even after Nosal and his associates quit Korn/Ferry and set
up their own business, they persuaded an ally still on the Korn/Ferry payroll to continue
funneling Search data to them. 159 A jury convicted Nosal of trade secret theft; Nosal appealed
and argued that Search data could not be considered a trade secret because it came from public
sources, that Korn/Ferry shared Search data with others, and that Nosal neither knew nor
intended that his unauthorized use of Search data would hurt Korn/Ferry. 160
Yet, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Nosal’s conviction of trade secret theft,
noting that the way in which publicly available information is combined, compiled, and integrated
can entitle the resulting product to protection as a trade secret. 161 Nosal's argument that Korn/Ferry
shared Search data with others was contradicted by evidence, such as the mandatory confidentiality
agreement that Nosal signed, and the fact that Korn/Ferry took aggressive measures to deter
unauthorized access to Search. 162 Given Nosal's confidentiality agreement and the prominent
warnings on Search's home screen and search lists, it is naive to think that Nosal was unaware that
unauthorized access to Search would injure Korn/Ferry. 163
The Court held that publicly available data can form the basis of a trade secret if a business
invests its own effort and creativity to create a product that exploits the data in such a way as to
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make it uniquely valuable to the business, and then aggressively protects the product from
unauthorized use. 164

Conclusion
The challenge that the CCPA now places on businesses is how to comply with consumer
privacy disclosure requirements while also complying with trade secret confidentiality
requirements. Requiring companies to disclose the “business or commercial purpose for collecting
or selling personal information” 165 essentially necessitates companies to disclose how or why their
trade secrets give them a market advantage by providing lists of the types of manipulated data that
they are selling as well as lists of who they sell that manipulated data to. Further, the “categories
of third parties with whom the business shares personal information” 166 is comparable to a client
list, which is a well-established trade secret right. 167
One way that businesses can potentially prevent their trade secrets from being disclosed
under the CCPA is by de-identifying their consumers’ “personal information” as defined by the
CCPA. If companies de-identify their consumers’ personal information, consumers then would
only be able to access data strictly related to their biographical information, and trade secret holders
would be free not to disclose the output of their data processing (behavior evaluation, forecast,
studies on life expectancy, personalized marketing plan, pricing, etc.). 168
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To the extent that any of the information a company must disclose under the CCPA is a
trade secret, there is another potential conflict between the goals of the CCPA and the protections
provided to certain information by California’s version of the UTSA. The CCPA could limit the
protection of potential trade secret information in California as the information either needs to be
a trade secret or protected by contract; all other tort claims do not exist. 169
As previously noted, the UTSA displaces all other non-contractual causes of action for
relief that are based on the misappropriation of trade secrets. 170 Under California's Uniform Trade
Secrets Act ("CUTSA"), a party may recover for the "actual loss" or other injury caused by the
misappropriation of trade secrets. 171 CUTSA defines misappropriation as (1) the improper
acquisition of a trade secret or (2) the non-consensual disclosure or use of a trade secret. 172
CUTSA provides an exclusive civil remedy for conduct falling within its terms, and courts
have reasoned that it displaces common law tort claims in two circumstances. 173 First, CUTSA
displaces claims that are "based on the same nucleus of facts as the misappropriation of trade
secrets claim for relief." 174 Stated differently, CUTSA displaces tort claims where they "do not
genuinely allege 'alternative legal theories' but are a transparent attempt to evade the strictures of
CUTSA by restating a trade secrets claim as something else." 175
Second, CUTSA displaces "all claims premised on the wrongful taking and use of
confidential business and proprietary information, even if that information does not meet the
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statutory definition of a trade secret." 176 A primary purpose of the UTSA “was to sweep away the
adopting states' bewildering web of rules and rationales and replace it with a uniform set of
principles for determining when one is and is not liable for acquiring, disclosing, or using
'information . . . of value.'" 177 "Information that does not fit" the definition of a trade secret, "and
is not otherwise made property by some provision of positive law, belongs to no one, and cannot
be converted or stolen." 178 Thus, if the basis of the alleged property right is in essence that the
information is not generally known to the public, then the claim is sufficiently close to a trade
secret claim that it should be superseded notwithstanding the fact that the information fails to meet
the definition of a trade secret. 179
While the appellant in Erhart v. Bofi Holding, Inc. did not plead a trade secret
misappropriation claim, the court held that BofI's tort claims implicated trade secret principles. 180
The gravamen of BofI's tort claims was that Erhart wrongfully accessed and took its "confidential
and proprietary information." 181 BofI also repeatedly used the terms "misappropriate" and
"misappropriation" in its pleading. 182 By not pleading a trade secret misappropriation claim, BofI
attempted to evade CUTSA's requirements, including proving that the information rises to the level

176

Erhart. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57137, at *102 (quoting ChromaDex, Inc. v. Elysium Health, Inc., 369 F. Supp.
3d 983, 989 (C.D. Cal. 2019)); accord Copart, Inc. v. Sparta Consulting, Inc., 277 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1158 (E.D. Cal.
2017); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 782 F. Supp. 2d 911, 987 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
177
Erhart. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57137, at *102 (quoting Silvaco, 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 at 53 n.22).
178
Id.
179
Id. (quoting SunPower Corp. v. SolarCity Corp., No. 12 CV 00694, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176284, 2012 WL
6160472, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2012) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1(d)(1)).
180
Id. at *104.
181
Id.
182
Id.

28

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW
of a protectable trade secret. 183 Yet, BofI still sought to impose liability on Erhart for "acquiring,
disclosing, or using" confidential information of purported value. 184
Given this conduct, BofI argued CUTSA does not displace BofI's tort claims that pursued
Erhart for the damages it incurred to recover this sensitive information and prevent unauthorized
disclosures. 185 The court felt that this argument had merit as BofI had an obligation to protect the
nonpublic personal information of its customers. 186 In this sense, BofI's allegations concerning
Erhart's unauthorized taking of customer financial information were more akin to a data breach
claim than a disguised trade secrets claim. 187 In the same vein, the Court found distinguishable
BofI’s allegation that Erhart wrongfully took nonpublic personal information of BofI's employees,
such as BofI's CEO's personal tax returns. 188 For CUTSA displacement, the Court found that there
was a meaningful distinction between BofI's efforts to safeguard this information, as compared to
BofI’s efforts to impose liability on Erhart for wrongfully taking "information containing BofI's
intellectual property" and the Bank's "confidential and proprietary information." 189
If, as the foregoing suggests, some of the information that database owners collect and
manipulate can be protected as a trade secret under California law, then a related question is
whether there are any circumstances that can require disclosure of the trade secret to either the
general public or governmental regulatory authorities. In an unpublished California case, the Court
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of Appeals held that a defendant is not entitled, prima facie, to the trade secret source code of a
DNA program used to identify the defendant. 190 Shelley H. was murdered in 1977, and a forensics
agency later conducted a DNA test on swabs taken from Shelley in 2011. 191 The DNA sample was
found to be a match for Martell Chubbs, who was subsequently arrested and tried for murder. 192
Chubbs filed a motion to compel discovery of the source code used in the software program
that identified Chubbs. 193 The plaintiff government of California, on behalf of the developer of the
software, filed an opposition motion, arguing that the source code was a protected trade secret and
that disclosure of the code would be financially devastating for the developer. 194 Chubbs countered
that the source code was essential to his defense because the DNA evidence was the only evidence
against him. 195 Without the source code, Chubbs claimed, there would be no way for Chubbs to
determine what assumptions were made regarding the evidence and if those assumptions were
appropriate. 196 The developer of the software testified that the source code was not needed to assess
the program’s reliability, and that publicly revealing the source code would allow competitors to
easily copy the program. 197
The Court held that Chubbs was not entitled to the source code of the DNA program used
to identify Chubbs for the murder of Shelly H.; the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse
to disclose the secret if the allowance of the privilege would not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise
work injustice. 198 Once the existence of a trade secret has been established, the party seeking
discovery must make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant
190
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and necessary to a material element of a cause of action in the case. 199 "[I]t is not enough that a
trade secret might be useful to real parties." 200
Unlike the criminal charge in Chubbs, a burden-shifting procedure is used to evaluate
assertion of the trade secret privilege in civil cases. 201 However, similar to the holding in Chubbs,
requiring companies to disclose their trade secrets under the CCPA without a prima facie,
particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to a cause of action
will give consumers a way to easily copy trade secret material. California is already a largely
technology-driven state, so when consumers start requesting companies to disclose information
about how the consumers’ personal information is collected, used, shared, or sold, trade secret
material will spread like wildfire. Mandating businesses to disclose their trade secret data to
consumers is problematic when courts do not require businesses to disclose trade secrets like
source code for a DNA test which could potentially convict someone of first-degree murder—
arguably a much more serious offense than a general right of privacy claim.
While the point of the CCPA is to provide consumers with privacy rights as they relate to
businesses’ use of consumers’ data, it is also debatable whether consumers have a reasonable
expectation of privacy for information that they themselves have already held out to a third
party. 202 Take a Facebook user’s profile, for example. No matter the privacy settings, a user is
holding out at least some information to third parties—those third parties could the general
Facebook public, or “friends of friends” tagged in a photo, perhaps. Depending on her privacy
settings, if Facebook user Laura posts a photo and tags her friend Daniel in it, Daniel’s friend
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Aimee can see Laura’s post even though Laura and Aimee are not “friends.” Although Laura may
not normally be holding out information to Aimee as a third party, she has done so in this instance.
Laura would have an unreasonable expectation of privacy in the scenario above. Yet, under
the CCPA, Laura could require Facebook to disclose to her what third parties Facebook sold her
data to even though she has already held the information out to third parties herself.
Another perspective to consider is that trade secrets are part of the privacy area of legal
persons. Even if the information that a consumer once provided to a company is still considered
a property right of the consumer, the consumer most certainly does not own the innovative
technique of how a company uses the consumer’s data in an algorithm or forecasting model, for
example. Trade secret protection is not based on a piece of information but is based on the
confidentiality behind that information. 203 After all, trade secrets are generally considered personal
data of businesses because they represent private data related to the intimacy of the legal person. 204
Trade secrets are not just a form of intangible asset of a company, but they are a form of protection
of personality rights of the businessperson and her employees. 205 Therefore, if the law also
protected legal persons’ personal data, the conflict between trade secret rights and data protection
rights thus becomes a conflict between a natural persons’ data protection (the consumers) and a
legal persons’ data protection (the company). 206
The issue ultimately comes down to which is more important—personal privacy or trade
privacy? One could argue that legal entities should not be considered as data subjects because they
already benefit from the protection of other sectors of the law like trade secrets, unfair competition,
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trademarks, and patents. 207 On the other hand, trade secrets are a large part of what gives a
company a competitive edge and what drives interstate commerce, which undoubtedly provides
the federal government with a vested interest in helping to keep trade secrets confidential. 208
Requiring disclosure of trade secret information to a consumer is almost sure to result in
the misappropriation of trade secrets because consumers have no obligation to keep a businesses’
trade secrets confidential. Suppose that, under the CCPA requirements, Apple® discloses to
consumer Julie Smith to whom and how her data is sold. Consumer Julie happens to work at a
competitor, Samsung. Julie could then easily disclose Apple’s trade secret to Samsung in her
normal line of work. Because Julie has no obligation under an employment agreement with Apple
to keep Apple’s trade secret confidential, Apple would likely have no recourse for trade secret
misappropriation under CUTSA. Further, because Apple had to “voluntarily” disclose the trade
secret to Julie under the CCPA, it could be difficult to argue that Apple made reasonable efforts to
maintain the secrecy to keep its trade secret confidential.
Requiring every consumer who requests information about their data usage under the
CCPA to sign a Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA) is one idea to help businesses show that they
have made efforts that are “reasonable under the circumstances to maintain the secrecy of their
trade secrets.” 209 However, obtaining every single consumers’ signature on an NDA would be
burdensome for businesses. Further, the CCPA explicitly states that a business shall not
discriminate against a consumer because the consumer exercised any of the consumer’s rights, 210

207

Id.
See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3., which gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states.”; See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) (holding that the federal
power to regulate production of goods for commerce is commerce if it has a “substantial economic effect” on
interstate commerce and that commerce is nationally significant in its cumulative effect, such as altering the supplyand-demand relationships in the interstate commodity market).
209
UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1985).
210
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.125 (Deering 2020).
208

33

CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW

so requiring every consumer to sign an NDA to receive information about the use of their data may
be considered a discriminatory or coercive practice in that it imposes additional obligations on the
consumer to receive the data they are requesting. Requiring NDA’s would also be against the
public policy of the CCPA in general.
While some remedies may exist to limit the disclosure of trade secrets under the obligations
of the CCPA, none are all-encompassing, and the success of any remedies is yet to be seen due to
the recency of the law. Moreover, as each state enacts legislation similar to the CCPA, the tangled
web of compliance will continue to spin.
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